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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
WHAT IF CHICKEN LITTLE IS RIGHT? 
As children, we learn the story of the melodramatic chicken who proclaimed to the 
world “the sky is falling.”  Why did he believe the sky was falling?  Because he felt a piece 
of it fall on his head.  In the end, we learn the sky wasn’t falling on poor Chicken Little.  He 
had been hit by a tiny acorn.   
In 2006, The Boston Globe made an announcement similar to Chicken Little’s claim.  
The sky wasn’t falling, but for many it felt like it was.  Journalist Charlie Savage introduced 
the news-reading public to a little known presidential tool - the signing statement.  
According to Savage, President Bush (hereinafter Bush II) had used this tool to personally 
challenge as many as 750 laws in his first six years in office.  The article went on to explain 
that while the president does have a duty to faithfully execute the laws, President Bush II 
had asserted that he did not have to execute a law if he personally believed it was 
unconstitutional.  As a result, he had declared the right to ignore “vast swaths of laws” 
(Savage 2006). 
The idea that a president does not have to execute a law he believes to be 
unconstitutional is unsettling to many people.  It also brings to mind other childhood 
lessons.  After all, every child is taught by her social studies teachers (and even School 
House Rock) that it is up to the Supreme Court to decide what is constitutional and what is 
not (School House Rock Three Ring Government). Was President Bush II using the signing 
statement to encroach upon judicial territory and, if so, why wasn’t the court doing 
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anything about it?  Is the sky really falling?  Maybe.  According to Phillip Cooper, a 
presidential scholar and signing statement expert who is quoted in the Savage article, 
“[t]his is really big, very expansive, and very significant” (Savage 2006). 
One might wonder how something this significant could stay under the radar for so 
long.  The answer has to do with how signing statements work.  They are not secret 
documents.  In fact, they are published in the United States Code Congressional and 
Administrative News as part of the legislative history of the bill with which they are 
associated.  However, they are typically issued with very little fanfare.  When a bill is 
signed the headline will likely state only that the law has passed, if it is reported in the 
news at all.  The fact that the president also included a document explaining his personal 
understanding of certain terms or giving directions to the executive agencies regarding 
exactly how they should carry out that law is almost never part of the headline.  At least it 
wasn’t part of the headline before Mr. Savage’s article.   
So, why was the signing statement finally worth our attention?  One word explains 
it - torture.  In 2005 Senator John McCain, prisoner of war survivor,  included an 
amendment to H.R. 2863, the Defense Supplemental Appropriations bill for 2006, 
mandating that the United States would not engage in torture of detainees.  The Bush II 
administration negotiated at length with Senator McCain but he was adamant and would 
not remove the amendment.  President Bush II finally signed H.R. 2863 and when he did he 
stated “[t]he Administration is committed to treating all detainees held by the United States 
in a manner consistent with our Constitution, laws, and treaty obligations, which reflect the 
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values we hold dear” (Bush, 2005a).  Later, however President Bush II added a second 
statement to the bill which read “[t]he executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A 
of the Act, related to detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of 
the president to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and 
consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power” (Bush, 2005b).  The fact 
that such statements typically don’t make headlines is not surprising because few people 
are able to read them and understand the direction the president is actually giving.  What 
did that second statement actually mean?  With respect to this particular bill it meant the 
president believed that, as Commander in Chief, it is up to him and him alone to determine 
what kind of interrogation techniques are used by the United States military.  More 
importantly, it meant the president believed he could sign a bill into law and at the same 
time declare that he would not follow portions of it.  
This is such a departure from most Americans’ understanding of the process that it 
is no surprise that the Savage article caused a stir.  How could the president ignore the 
separation of powers doctrine and claim executive and judicial powers at the same time?  
Arguably he was taking on a legislative role as well because, by picking and choosing 
which parts of a bill to follow and which ones not to follow, he was essentially rewriting 
legislation.  Why would President Bush II believe he could do such a thing? 
The president was actually adding to a long history of presidential signing 
statements that began with President James Monroe (Kelley and Marshall 2008).  Most of 
the statements issued before the 1980s, however, were harmless announcements attached to 
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a bill, akin to a glorified press release.  These glorified press releases (rhetorical signing 
statements) were used to express appreciation or make a political point (Cooper 2002: 214).  
They are not controversial and don’t raise constitutional concerns.   
Rhetorical signing statements, however, are nothing like the statements reported in 
the Savage article, which arguably change the law that congress passed.  Use of more 
controversial signing statements actually dates to President Andrew Jackson in 1830.  The 
signing statement issued by President Jackson explained his concerns with a bill involving 
road examinations and surveys.  President Jackson’s actions were later criticized in a House 
report as being comparable to a line item veto (Halstead 2007: 2).  
The first constitutional challenge was made in a signing statement in 1842.  
President John Tyler challenged a bill involving the apportionment of House districts.  His 
statement received little respect and was called an “extraneous document” that should be 
considered a “defacement of the public records and archives”(ABA Report: 7).  Signing 
statements that make constitutional challenges are potentially the most controversial type 
and were used extensively by the Bush II administration.   
Sometimes signing statements are issued in an attempt to influence the judicial 
branch.  This tactic was made popular by the Reagan administration.  According to the 
ABA taskforce, the Reagan administration used signing statements as a “strategic weapon 
in a campaign to influence the way legislation was interpreted by the courts and executive 
agencies” (ABA Report: 10).   
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More people started to pay attention to signing statements after the Savage article.  
However, that doesn’t mean the public, or the legal and political science world for that 
matter, clearly understood their use and ramifications.  Was the signing statement and its 
extensive use by the Bush administration just a blip on the radar of presidential power?  Or, 
did the extensive use of the signing statement by Bush II work to significantly expand the 
power of the presidency to a point that this expanded role in the legislative and judicial 
process will be enjoyed by all presidents to come?  In the 6 years since the publication of the 
Savage article, the White House has shifted not only to a new president, but to a new party 
as well.  To determine whether the sky is falling as a result of the signing statement, it is 
important to look at that new presidency.   
This thesis will examine the use of the signing statement throughout history.  It will 
focus on the development of the signing statement from the Reagan Administration to 
present day.  It will address the different types of signing statements and the constitutional 
ramifications of each.  It will then offer a course of action for a president to follow to ensure 
the use of signing statements is not only beneficial to the president, but also constitutional.  
Hopefully, by following this course of action, future presidents can help make sure that the 
sky does not fall.   
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CHAPTER 2. OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Signing statements have not been a subject of research for many political science 
scholars.  There are some interested scholars but, compared to other topics, this is one that 
is relatively understudied.  As a result, a few names tend to come up again and again 
during research.  Below is a summary and synthesis of the most influential authors and 
works on the topic from the 1980s to today.  These articles cover the most important 
developments with signing statements, beginning with the Reagan administration which 
brought about a change to the quality and quantity of signing statements.  The tool has 
grown in significance ever since.  These authors espouse different opinions regarding the 
appropriate use and constitutionality of signing statements. They also are often quoted in 
newspaper interviews and government reports relating to the controversy surrounding 
signing statements that began with the Savage article. 
One early article and a good starting point for constitutional evaluation of signing 
statements is Marc N. Garber and Kurt A. Wimmer’s 1987 article, “Presidential Signing 
Statements as Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of 
Power.”  This article was written in response to the first modern expansion of the use of the 
signing statement by the Reagan Presidency.  According to Garber and Wimmer, Ronald 
Reagan and his staff were using signing statements in an attempt to regain some of the 
power they believed the office of the president had lost as a result of the Watergate scandal.  
In the article, Garber and Wimmer examine practices of the Reagan presidency regarding 
signing statements.  They assert that while previous presidents used signing statements to 
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note their disapproval, the Reagan administration used them in an attempt to reinterpret 
the language of a bill into something that matched the president’s views about the 
legislation and not necessarily the intent of congress (Garber and Wimmer: 366). 
While this targeted use of signing statements was noteworthy, its impact would not 
necessarily be felt by many had it not corresponded with another interesting move on the 
part of Reagan’s team.  In order to “make sure that the president’s own understanding of 
what’s in a bill is the same… or is given consideration at the time of statutory construction 
later on by a court,” Reagan’s Attorney General, Edwin Meese, worked out a deal with 
West Publishing to include signing statements in the U.S. Code Congressional and 
Administrative News (Garber and Wimmer: 367).  These statements of executive history did 
more than state the executive intent in signing the bill, they asserted the legislative intent in 
passing the bill.  Garber and Wimmer called this an “overt attempt to usurp power 
reserved for the Legislature and the Judiciary” (Garber and Wimmer: 366).   
After explaining the methods of the Reagan Administration and its use of signing 
statements, Garber and Wimmer argue that the statements should not be used by the courts 
as evidence of congressional intent.  They assert that doing so is a violation of the 
separation of powers doctrine in two ways.  First, it allows the president to make law by 
substituting his interpretation of the bill’s terms in place of congressional intent.  Second, 
by substituting his interpretation for their own, the courts are letting the president usurp 
the judiciary’s role as well.  Garber and Wimmer stress that these statements are inherently 
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unreliable as evidence of legislative intent and, for this and other reasons, should not be 
considered by the courts (Garber and Wimmer). 
A second important source is Phillip Cooper’s book By order of the President: The Use 
and Abuse of Executive Direct Action written in 2002.  The book includes a chapter specifically 
addressing the signing statement.  While this chapter includes information about the 
historical development of the signing statement and the importance of the deal Meese 
struck with West Publishing, it focuses on the similarity between the signing statement and 
the line-item veto.   
Cooper explains that the actual line-item veto was a short-lived tool of the 
presidency enjoyed only by the Clinton administration.  Challenges to this legislatively 
enacted power seemed imminent from the beginning and the line-item veto didn’t last 
long.  The Supreme Court struck it down on separation of powers grounds.  The Court 
found that allowing a president to strike certain passages of a law is the equivalent of 
allowing him to write a new law, thus infringing on the power of the legislative branch.  
Cooper explains how presidents have used signing statements in a manner similar to the 
line-item veto to “specifically reject provisions of statutes even as they signed the 
legislation” (Cooper 2002: 204).  Cooper draws the parallel between these two devices and 
argues that the use of a signing statement in this way is inappropriate.  He continues by 
explaining that, even though inappropriate, presidents might strategically use signing 
statements to achieve their policy goals.  He concludes by stating that signing statements 
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have become a “potent, and potentially very dangerous, tool of presidential direct action.” 
(Cooper 2002: 230). 
Cooper again addressed signing statements in his article, “George W. Bush, Edgar 
Allan Poe, and the Use and Abuse of Presidential Signing Statements.”  This article, written 
in 2005, starts by noting that President Bush II did not veto a bill in more than four years in 
the White House.  While some commentators viewed this as a sign of weakness in an 
otherwise strong president, Cooper stressed that the lack of vetoes was not a sign of 
weakness but the result of something else.  Bush II simply did not need the veto because of 
his extensive use of the signing statement.  According to Cooper while Bush II used the 
signing statement as an effective substitute for the line-item veto, he actually went beyond 
that.  Bush II used the signing statement in a new way not only to address specific elements 
of specific bills, but also to “significantly reposition and strengthen the powers of the 
presidency relative to the congress” (Cooper 2005: 516).   
Bush II accomplished this by challenging large sections of bills based on broad 
constitutional objections.  Essentially, he used signing statements to insist that Article II of 
the Constitution does not permit any interference with the president’s “control of the 
unitary executive” (Cooper 2005: 522).  Based on this theory, Bush II claimed the executive 
branch had the power to ignore multiple legislative mandates, including, for example, 
requirements that the executive branch report directly to congress and prohibitions against 
the use of torture (Cooper 2005). 
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Cooper seems impressed despite himself at Bush II’s bold claim to power through 
the use of the signing statement.  It is a tool that is rarely noticed by the public and allows 
these challenges to be “hidden in plain sight,” hence the Edgar Allen Poe reference.  Cooper 
leaves little doubt that he believes this usurpation of power by the Bush II administration 
lacks constitutional support, especially in light of the fact that the Supreme Court has 
rejected the legislatively enacted line-item veto.  It would not logically follow that a 
president could use a similar tool, and one that was not even granted statutorily at that, to 
reach an end that the Court already struck down (Cooper, 2005: 530). 
Curtis A. Bradley and Eric A. Posner take a very different view of the importance 
and appropriateness of signing statements in their 2006 article “Presidential Signing 
Statements and Executive Power.”  They take the position that signing statements, as 
described above, do not violate the doctrine of separation of powers or the legislative 
process.  And, contrary to the opinion of Phillip Cooper, they believe signing statements 
can sometimes be used as evidence of statutory meaning (Bradley and Posner). 
Much of their article focuses on addressing critics’ challenges to the Bush II 
administration specifically.  One such challenge is the belief that signing statements could 
be used to direct the officials of the executive branch not to enforce statutes based on 
“dubious constitutional theories.”  However, Bradley and Posner argue that, because 
presidents can use any number of tools to reach this same end critics should not be 
concerned with the signing statement but with the underlying policy (Bradley and Posner: 
310).   
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After addressing the “dubious constitutional theories” challenge and other Bush II 
related criticisms, Bradley and Posner take a step by step approach to answering the 
various challenges raised against the use of signing statements generally.  First, regarding 
signing statements that make constitutional challenges, they claim there is no crisis or 
reason for concern.  According to Bradley and Posner, since the president is actually 
obligated under the “Take Care Clause” to comply with the constitution, “if the president 
believes that a statute violates the constitution, he has a constitutional obligation not to 
enforce it” (Bradley and Posner: 358).  
The second argument they address is the concern that the president could use 
signing statements to “thwart the will of congress” and that, even if the courts do not give 
weight to signing statements, they still might cause harm to the constitution by changing 
the norms and the division of power between the different branches of government.  They 
believe this concern is vulnerable to two different responses.  First, congress and the 
president have a variety of tools and tactics that they use in negotiating and relating to each 
other and no one outside of those offices really knows how it works.  So, it is “impossible to 
say whether the signing statement gives the president a significant advantage over 
congress” (Bradley and Posner: 360).  Second, they believe this concern really rests on 
whether the individual believes the president has too little or too much power relative to 
that of congress.  To challenge the signing statement as giving the president too much 
power, one must first be sure that the current level of power of the president is either just 
right or too much.  According to Bradley and Posner, there is too much controversy on the 
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issue of the appropriate balance of power for the signing statement to be a deciding factor 
(Bradley and Posner: 361).  
Bradley and Posner are strong supporters of the signing statement or, at the very 
least, they do not believe there is reason to be concerned about them.  They assert that 
courts rarely rely on or refer to signing statements in their opinions even though they are 
included as legislative history.  Bradley and Posner also stress that, while Bush II 
challenged hundreds of provisions of law, critics have not identified a “single instance 
where the Bush administration followed through on the language in the signing statement 
and refused to enforce the statute as written.”  Therefore, they claim that signing 
statements are mostly political rhetoric and, are not a constitutional concern (Bradley and 
Posner: 332).    
Christopher S. Kelley and Bryan W. Marshall of Miami University are possibly the 
most active scholars currently researching signing statements. They published articles in 
2008, 2009 and 2010 and are currently publishing a book on the topic (Email from 
Christopher Kelly).  Each of their articles addresses a slightly different aspect of the use of 
this tool.  Their first article, “The Last Word: Presidential Power and the Role of Signing 
Statements,” examines the use of the signing statement as one of the many tools a president 
has when working with the other branches of government.  They spend very little time 
discussing challenges to the constitutionality or appropriateness of signing statements and 
instead hold them up as an important tool that presidents can use to protect, and even 
enhance, presidential power.  They briefly acknowledge the controversy around some of 
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the signing statements used by Bush II.  But, they focus on the usefulness of signing 
statements to influence policy when other methods break down.  They argue this is most 
often the case in times of divided government.  In those times, they believe the signing 
statement can be used to avoid gridlock (Kelley and Marshall 2008).   
Kelley and Marshall, like other scholars, recognize the Reagan presidency as the 
time when the use of signing statements took on new importance.  They stress that, after 
the Watergate scandal, congress began to dial back the freedom and power the office of the 
president had gained during much of the 20th century.  The signing statement was seen as 
a way for the Reagan White House to strategically regain some of the power lost at that 
time (Kelley and Marshall 2008: 254). 
The focus of this particular article is to determine what conditions make a signing 
statement more likely on a given piece of legislation.  They hypothesize that the most 
important conditions will be divided government and the importance of the particular 
piece of legislation.  After analyzing these variables using a logit model, they conclude that 
these two factors are important in determining when a signing statement will be used by a 
president (Kelley and Marshall 2008).   
Kelley and Marshall’s 2009 article, “Assessing Presidential Power, Signing 
Statements and Veto Threats as Coordinated Strategies,” analyzes the use of the signing 
statement as part of the veto bargaining process.  In this article, they used a spatial model to 
analyze how a signing statement can help a president reach, or at least come closer, to his 
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desired legislative outcome.  They assert that the president can achieve more with the 
signing statement than he could with the veto alone (518). 
In their 2010 article, “Going it Alone: The Politics of Signing Statements from 
Reagan to Bush II,” Kelley and Marshall again use a logit model, this time to examine 
signing statements used to make constitutional challenges.  According to their research, this 
type of signing statement is actually more likely during a unified government and is 
unrelated to issues of gridlock.  As the title of the article suggests, they found that using a 
signing statement allows a president to “go it alone” and “have the last word on legislation 
signed into law” (Kelley and Marshall 2010: 183). 
No review of signing statement literature would be complete without including the 
work of Charlie Savage.  While he is not a constitutional or political science scholar, his 
contribution to the field is no less important than the work of the scholars discussed so far.  
It was his 2006 Boston Globe Article, after all, that brought signing statements out of 
oblivion and into public discourse for the first time.  His announcement that “President 
Bush has quietly claimed the authority to disobey more than 750 laws enacted since he took 
office” was the decree that lead scholars, bloggers, members of congress and even the 
American Bar Association (ABA) to believe that the sky was falling.  His article was 
thoroughly researched and included interviews with Christopher Kelley, Phillip Cooper 
and other scholars (Savage 2006).   
In a time when political news seems to be more about scandal than substance, 
Savage has attempted to keep the public abreast of the developments around the signing 
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statement saga.  In 2007, he interviewed then-candidate Obama and, among other things, 
questioned him about his beliefs regarding the appropriate use of signing statements.  
Obama answered that he would “not use signing statements to nullify or undermine 
congressional instructions as enacted into law” (Savage 2007).  In 2009, Savage followed up 
on his 2006 article with an article entitled “Obama’s Embrace of a Bush Tactic Riles 
Congress.”   
Savage’s 2006 article prompted the creation of an ABA task force to examine the use 
of signing statements.  This task force released a report in August 2006 that made four 
important recommendations to presidents regarding the use of signing statements.  First, 
the report recommends that when the president believes a bill is unconstitutional he should 
communicate his concern to congress.  Second, if the concerns are not addressed when the 
bill reaches the president’s desk, he should veto the bill.  Third, the ABA report 
recommends that congress enact legislation requiring the president to submit copies of all 
signing statements to congress.  Fourth, the report recommends new legislation that would 
allow the president, congress or other involved individuals to seek judicial review 
whenever the president claims the authority to disregard any section of a bill or to interpret 
a law in a way that is inconsistent with the clear intent of congress. 
As stated above, a search of traditional scholarly sources for research and writing on 
the topic of signing statements does not lead to a significant number of results.  But, there 
are a handful of scholars working to bring attention to the topic.  Their work, along with 
the work of journalists and bloggers, has helped raise awareness within government as well 
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as in the public.  As a result, there have been multiple congressional hearings on the topic, 
an ABA special taskforce report, a letter from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
focusing on the topic and a report from the Congressional Research Service (CRS).  Taken 
together, these sources paint a complete picture of the history, use, and potential future 
issues regarding this little known presidential tool. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS 
INTRODUCTION 
A little ground work is necessary before determining when or if a president should 
use a signing statement.  This section provides a brief history of the use of signing 
statements, a breakdown of the different types of signing statements, a discussion of when 
each type is used, and finally, a discussion of the difference between the signing statement 
and certain other tools in the presidential arsenal.   
 
HISTORY 
Casual observers of the use of signing statements likely would believe they are a 
new phenomenon.  This is a reasonable belief given the lack of information available in the 
press or even scholarly journals prior to 1986.   However, that belief couldn’t be further 
from the truth.  Signing statements actually have been around for more than a century; yet 
there is still no official established definition.  According to the Government Accountability 
Office, a signing statement usually refers to a presidential statement or press release that is 
issued in connection with the signing of a bill (Kepplinger 2007).  The first signing 
statement is traced back to President James Monroe in 1822.  The particular law in question 
involved the commissioning and Senate confirmation of certain military officers.  President 
Monroe believed there was some confusion in the law regarding whether the promotion of 
four officers required Senate approval.  He determined that they did require Senate 
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approval and, therefore, submitted the commissions to the Senate.  His statement was a 
letter to the Senate explaining the situation (Monroe 1822). 
The first controversial use of a signing statement is traced to President Andrew 
Jackson in 1830.  The bill dealt with road examinations and surveys.  President Jackson took 
issue with a provision in the bill calling for a road from Detroit to Chicago and announced 
that the appropriation would be allowed only for the construction of the road in the 
territory of Michigan (Jackson 1830).  Jackson’s signing statement was later criticized in a 
House report as an action comparable to a line-item veto (Halstead 2007: 2).   
The first time a constitutional challenge was made in a signing statement was in 
1842 when President John Tyler respectfully disagreed with provisions regarding 
apportionment of house districts.  John Quincy Adams was the spokesman for the House at 
the time and he referred to the signing statement as an “extraneous document” and said 
that it should be considered a “defacement of the public records and archives” (ABA 
Report: 7). 
While other presidents did use signing statements like Tyler and Jackson to state 
their interpretations or beliefs about constitutionality during the 19th and 20th centuries, the 
vast majority of signing statements have been little more than “glorified press releases.”  
(Kelley and Marshall 2009: 513).  This changed significantly with the Reagan 
Administration.  President Reagan made the signing statement what it is today (Cooper 
2002: 201).  Maybe no other piece of evidence is more supportive of this fact than the simple 
change in numbers.  As Figure 1 indicates, the use of signing statements for constitutional 
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challenges or objections, before the Reagan Administration, was far outweighed by 
rhetorical signing statements.  The Reagan presidency ushered in a noticeable change, not 
in the overall number of signing statements, but in their purpose (Kelley 2002). (See 
Appendix 1 for a complete table of presidential signing statements.) 
  
Figure 1. Presidential Signing Statements Roosevelt to Obama 
Not only was there a shift from rhetorical to substantive statements, but substantive 
statements took on a new character as well.  Unlike the pre-Reagan era where presidents 
used substantive signing statements to note their disapproval or give guidance to congress 
regarding something they believed should change in the future, the new purpose of the 
signing statement involved an attempt by the president to reinterpret the language of a bill 
to coincide with his views (Garber and Wimmer: 366).  Reagan and his advisors believed 
presidential power had been seriously diminished by congress since the days of the Nixon 
administration.  The signing statement was used as part of an overall strategy to gain back 
some of that power (Kelley and Marshall 2008: 254). 
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The most noteworthy move in this strategic game was made by Reagan’s Attorney 
General Edwin Meese.  Meese struck a deal with West Publishing to publish presidential 
signing statements in the United States Code Congressional and Administrative News as part of 
the legislative history (Kelley and Marshall 2008: 251).  Meese asserted to the press that 
including signing statements in legislative history was necessary to ensure the president’s 
understanding of a bill was either the same as that of congress or to alert the judicial branch 
to the differences (Meese 1986).  This view was supported by then Deputy Assistant to the 
Attorney General (and now Supreme Court Justice) Samuel Alito.  Alito asserted that the 
president’s approval of a bill was just as important as the approval of congress and, 
therefore, it followed that the president’s understanding of the bill should be part of the 
legislative history (Kelley and Marshall 2008: 251). 
Including signing statements as part of legislative history was important because it 
would make them much more accessible to the public.  More importantly, they became 
easily accessible to the courts and administrative agencies.  According to the ABA taskforce 
report, the Reagan administration used signing statements as a “strategic weapon in a 
campaign to influence the way legislation was interpreted by the courts and executive 
agencies” (ABA Report: 10).  The Reagan administration also relied on a key Supreme 
Court decision as part of this campaign.  According to the Chevron case, an agency head 
could interpret a vague or undefined provision when congress had not provided a clear 
meaning in the legislative history (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 1984).  The Reagan Administration built on the foundation provided by Chevron to 
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determine that the president, as the head of all administrative agencies, could use signing 
statements to direct bureaucrats in interpreting those vague terms (Kelley and Marshall 
2008: 252). 
As Figure 1 indicates, the use of signing statements as a way to make constitutional 
challenges did not end with President Reagan.  President George H.W. Bush (hereinafter 
Bush I) issued 228 signing statements during his presidency, 107 of which raised a 
constitutional or legal objection to the law (Halstead 2007: 5).  Bush I was known for 
challenging statements when the underlying policy objective of the bill was not consistent 
with his own policy objectives (Cooper 2002).   
One such policy was affirmative action.  Bush I was a known opponent of most 
affirmative action programs and, for example, used a signing statement to disregard 
congressionally mandated affirmative action policies as they applied to contracting for the 
Department of Energy.  In his signing statement the president stated “I therefore direct the 
Secretary… to administer the section in a constitutional manner” (Cooper 2002: 206).  While 
that language may seem a bit cryptic to the layperson, to Bush I’s administration the point 
was clear.  The affirmative action requirements would not be followed because the 
president had determined they were unconstitutional. 
Bush I also was creative in the use of signing statements in another way.  On at least 
two occasions he actually arranged to have colloquies inserted into the congressional 
record and then relied on those statements as support for his interpretation of the law in his 
signing statement.  He did so even though there was more evidence in favor of a different 
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interpretation of the statute (ABA Report: 12).  Bush I used this tactic in his most 
controversial signing statement, which was issued when he signed the 1991 Civil Rights 
Act.  In that act, congress made it clear that they wished to return to a definition of 
“disparate impact” that had been used before the Ward’s Cove decision.  However, again 
relying on inserted colloquy, the president stated that the act codified rather than over 
ruled Ward’s Cove (ABA Report: 12). 
The Clinton Presidency didn’t end the use of substantive signing statements, but it 
did signal another change in how they would be used.  Of his 381 statements, only 70 
raised concerns or objections (substantive signing statements).  This is 18% of his signing 
statements in that category as compared to 47% for Bush I and 34% for Reagan (Halstead 
2007: 6, 5, & 3).  While this is a change, the reduced percentage of constitutional challenges 
should not be misunderstood as an indication that Clinton was against using signing 
statements in this way.  First, notice the significantly higher number of rhetorical 
statements used by Clinton, 311 as opposed to 121 for Bush I and 164 for Reagan (Halstead 
2007).  The sheer number of rhetorical statements is one reason for the decreased 
percentage of his total statements that did raise constitutional or interpretive concerns.  
Nevertheless, absolute numbers of substantive statements are down, even compared to 
Bush I, who was only in office for four years. 
The substantive signing statement became a more important tool for President 
Clinton after the 1994 midterm elections when the democrats lost control of congress.  In 
that same year, White House counsel Abner Mikva received support for the use of signing 
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statements in the form of a memo from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger.  The 
“Dellinger Memo,” as it is known, addressed the question of whether the President of the 
United States has the authority to decline to execute unconstitutional statutes.  The memo 
cited little constitutional authority or case law, but did announce that, in many instances 
not only can the president refuse to execute a law he believed to be unconstitutional, but 
should do so (Dellinger memo). 
While Clinton’s reduced use of substantive signing statements based on percentages 
could have indicated a step back to the pre-Reagan days, the Bush II administration 
reversed that trend and, in fact, brought about the most significant change in the use of 
signing statements.  As was the case with the Clinton administration, this change cannot be 
seen by a quick look at raw numbers.  In fact, Bush II’s use of signing statements might 
seem quite modest based on raw numbers.  After all, he issued only 161 in his eight years in 
office as opposed to the 228 issued by his father in only four years (Coherentbable.com, 
2011).  To truly understand the impact of the Bush II presidency, however, one must look at 
the scope and nature of his signing statements.  Taking a cue from president Reagan, who 
used signing statements as part of a larger plan to rebuild presidential power, Bush II used 
them to grow the office of the president to previously unreached levels of presidential 
power as part of his Unitary Executive theory (Halstead 2007: 10).  According to Phillip 
Cooper, “[t]here is no question that [the Bush II] administration has been involved in a very 
carefully thought-out, systematic process of expanding presidential power at the expense of 
the other branches of government” (Cooper in Savage 2006). 
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The number of signing statements was not as important in the Bush II 
administration as was the number of challenges included within those statements.  The 161 
signing statements issued by Bush II actually challenged approximately 1,100 provisions of 
law do to the omnibus nature of legislation.  To put this in perspective, before Bush II took 
office signing statements had only been used to challenge 600 provisions of law by all the 
other presidents combined (ABA Report: 14).   
Not only was the number of challenges of the Bush II administration noteworthy, 
the broad nature of the language used in the challenges, which he used repeatedly, was as 
well.  When Bush II signed H.R. 2863, the Defense Supplemental Appropriation, he 
included the following statement “[t]he executive branch shall construe Title X in Division 
A of the Act, related to detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority 
of the president to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and 
consistent with the Constitutional limitations on the judicial power, which will assist in 
achieving the shared objective of the congress and the president, evidenced in Title X, of 
protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks” (Bush 2005b).  This language 
was actually used by Bush II in at least 82 different signing statements through 2005 
(Cooper 2005: 521).  Like other signing statements already discussed, the language does a 
good job of hiding the significance of the statement.  What this particular statement did was 
state that the Bush II administration didn’t intend to follow the McCain Amendment 
restricting the use of torture for detainees.   
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Although that particular signing statement turned signing statements into headline 
news, Bush II made a habit of using them in several other subject matter areas.  One key 
area had to do with requirements in bills for the executive branch to give reports to 
congress.  Such a requirement was included in the USA PATRIOT act.  The signing 
statement Bush II issued when signing the act indicated that the Bush II administration 
would consider the requirement to produce such reports to be advisory (Cooper 2005: 523).  
According to Cooper, in the first term of the Bush II presidency, the default position 
became “when in doubt challenge legislative provisions whether there is a serious issue or 
not” (Cooper 2005: 531).  The Bush II administration took this practice as far as routing 
every new bill through Vice President Cheney’s office so that he could look for possible 
threats to the “Unitary Executive” (ABA Report: 15). 
According to Unitary Executive Theory, the president has the power to act 
unilaterally in a wide range of areas and these areas cannot be encroached upon by 
congress.  These areas include foreign relations, military affairs, national security and 
intelligence policy.  It is in these areas that Bush II most often issued constitutional 
challenges with signing statements.  The theory relies on the Article II, § 1“vesting” clause 
of the constitution which states that executive power shall be vested in a “President of the 
United States of America.”  According to the theory, this clause, along with the Oath of 
office (also found in Article II, § 1 of the Constitution) in which the president promises to 
“faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my 
Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States,” have been 
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interpreted to mean that it is within the power of the president to determine whether or not 
a law is constitutional.  Unitary Executive Theory has been aggressively used since 1987 
when then Attorney General Ed Meese explained in an address to Tulane Law School that 
the constitution is up for the interpretation of all branches and not just the courts (Kelley 
and Marshall 2009: 515-516).  But, this idea of a “unitary executive” has been called an 
extreme construction by some who claim that it lacks judicial sanction (Kinkopf 2006: 6).   
While Bush II used signing statements in a previously unprecedented way, their 
study would be the focus of historians rather than political scientists but for one important 
fact, the legacy did not end with Bush II.  President Obama may have curtailed their use, 
but some argue he has embraced the device that he once criticized Bush II for utilizing 
(Savage 2009).  Even though signing statements would hardly register on most polls as a 
topic of concern to the American public, they did find their way into the 2008 presidential 
campaign.  Along the campaign trail, then-candidate Obama was asked a simple question 
during one of his stops: “When congress offers you a bill do you promise not to use 
presidential signage to get your way?” After giving the crowd a quick civics lesson on the 
separation of powers and Bush II’s interest in expanding presidential power, candidate 
Obama made the following statement “I believe in the constitution and I will obey the 
constitution of the United States. We’re not going to use Signing Statements as a way of 
doing an end run around congress” (YouTube).   
Candidate Obama also answered a question about signing statements in a 2007 
interview for the Boston Globe.  He again explained his belief that president Bush II used 
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signing statements to change the meaning of legislation and to raise “implausible or 
dubious constitutional objections.”  Obama did add that signing statements are appropriate 
when used properly to protect the “president’s constitutional prerogatives,” but stated the 
Bush II administration had taken this too far (Savage 2007).  So, while Obama clearly left 
the door open regarding his use of signing statements, his statements on the campaign trail 
were understood as a pledge not to use them to change laws that do not match the 
president’s policy objectives or to insert the president’s interpretation in the place of 
congress’s interpretation.  Because of this pledge, journalists have been keeping a close eye 
on President Obama and his use of this controversial tool.   
President Obama used a signing statement for the first time on February 17, 2009.  It 
was a rhetorical statement attached to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and, 
therefore, did not cause any controversy.  However, he did get people talking less than a 
month later when he shared his “Memo for the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies” as a press release.  The memo explained that he would not use signing 
statements to disregard statutory provisions because of policy disagreements but that 
signing statements do serve a legitimate legislative function.  According to President 
Obama, the statements can be used when they are based on “well founded constitutional 
objections.”   He further explained that he would use caution and restraint but, based on his 
duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, he believed he had a responsibility to 
determine whether any provisions in a bill were unconstitutional.  These statements, while 
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somewhat restrained, on the one hand, sound very much like Unitary Executive Theory on 
the other.   
To date (November 1, 2011), president Obama has issued 17 signing statements and 
has used 9 of them to challenge some aspect of the law (Coherentbabble.com).  The most 
recent statement is so far, his most controversial.  The statement was attached to the Fiscal 
Year 2011 budget bill and addressed a provision that stripped funding for four presidential 
“czars.”  President Obama argued in the statement that he has the authority to appoint 
such advisers and that it is unconstitutional for congress to try to inhibit this ability (Taylor 
2011).  He did not state that the provisions would not be enforced as Bush II likely would 
have done.  Nevertheless, at the end of the statement he wrote “the executive branch will 
construe section 2262 not to abrogate these presidential prerogatives” (Obama 2011).  This 
refers to his ability to appoint certain advisors which the bill clearly intends to limit.  So, he 
is using this statement to explain that he will follow the bill only to the extent that he 
believes the provisions are constitutional.  While this probably is consistent with his 
campaign pledge, it is not necessarily palatable to those who believe signing statements 
should not be used to make constitutional challenges.  Seventeen statements in 35 months is 
a significant decrease as compared to the pattern from Reagan to Bush II.  Still, the tool is 
alive and kicking and the question of whether it is constitutionally sound is alive as well.   
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TYPES OF SIGNING STATEMENTS 
As explained briefly in the introduction above, there are two different types of 
signing statements.  First, there are rhetorical signing statements.  These are little more than 
press releases and are not considered controversial.  They have been used to express 
appreciation, recognize the importance of the new legislation, or sometimes to chastise 
legislators.  The second type of signing statement is much more controversial and bears 
little resemblance to its rhetorical cousin.  These are called substantive signing statements.  
Substantive signing statements can be broken down into two further subcategories, 
interpretive and constitutional.   
Interpretive signing statements, as the name suggests, interpret the bill.  Even after 
all the time and effort that congress takes in drafting legislation, certain terms or provisions 
can still be ambiguous.  In those cases, the president might include an interpretive signing 
statement explaining his interpretation of the ambiguous provisions or terms.  With this 
type of statement, the president will either define undefined terms in a statute or clarify 
terms or provisions that he believes are unclear.    
Constitutional signing statements, on the other hand, address the constitutionality 
of a bill.  The president will use a constitutional signing statement to state his opinion that 
the bill or parts of the bill are unconstitutional (Kelley and Marshall 2008).  From the early 
days of our republic, presidents have argued that they have the power to determine what is 
constitutional and what is not.  In part, they have relied on Federalist Number 49 in which 
James Madison explains that, while the different branches of government will be given 
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different powers, none of them “can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the 
boundaries between their respective powers” (Federalist No. 49).  More recently, they have 
argued that the Oath of office found in Article II, § I, which states “I do solemnly swear (or 
affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of the president of the United States, and will 
to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United 
States,” means they are obligated to refuse to defend or execute provisions of law that they 
believe are unconstitutional (Kelley and Marshall 2008: 253).  As a result, presidents have 
argued that constitutional signing statements are appropriate. 
Presidents Reagan, Bush I and Clinton all cited their duty to ensure that the laws are 
faithfully executed as evidence of their ability to ignore provisions of law they believed 
were unconstitutional.  The syllogism here goes as follows:  
Premise 1.  The president has a duty to take care that the laws are faithfully 
executed: 
Premise 2.  The Constitution is the supreme law of the land: 
Premise 3.  The Constitution is included in the “laws” that the president must make 
sure are faithfully executed: 
Conclusion.  Therefore, enforcing a law that violates the Constitution would violate 
the president’s duty (Cooper 2005: 206-7).   
Versions of this argument continue to be cited in articles that support the liberal use of 
signing statements (Bradley and Posner). 
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Substantive signing statements not only differ in type, interpretive or constitutional, 
but they also differ in purpose.  One purpose is to influence the judicial branch, attempting 
to influence congress and giving direction to the enforcing administrative agency.  Their 
significance in influencing the judicial branch changed dramatically when Edwin Meese 
struck the deal with West Publishing to include signing statements as part of the legislative 
history.   Doing so made the statements readily accessible to justices and to the public.  A 
second purpose is to influence congress.  Presidents attempt to influence congress by using 
signing statements to explain the provisions they have issues with and to encourage 
congress to repeal those provisions.  Finally, presidents use signing statements to direct 
administrative agencies.  They do so by including directions to agency officials who are 
responsible for administering the law.  This way the president can make sure that the bill is 
carried out appropriately.  There are, of course, times when one signing statement may 
include both interpretive and constitutional challenges and may be designed for multiple 
purposes.  (See Appendix 2 for a flow chart of substantive signing statements and their 
purposes.) 
 
DISTINGUISHING SIGNING STATEMENTS FROM OTHER PRESIDENTIAL TOOLS 
Some supporters of signing statements argue that their critics should not/do not 
really have a problem with the tool; instead the problem they have is with the particular 
policy end the statement is used to achieve.  While this may be true in some instances, there 
are distinct advantages and disadvantages of signing statements and the other tools to 
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which they are compared.  These different devices are drawn from different constitutional 
provisions or traditional practices.  As such, it is important to point out some of the 
differences between signing statements and the other tools used by presidents when they 
take unilateral action. 
 
Line-item Veto 
Critics of signing statements often compare them to the line-item veto.  The line-
item veto is used by Governors throughout the country and, for a short time; it was used by 
the president of the United States.  In 1996 congress passed the Line-Item Veto Act.  The 
purpose of the act was to allow the president to remove earmarks from bills.  It gave him 
the power to eliminate sections of bills that he didn’t want, without the trouble of vetoing 
the entire bill.  Congress then could override the items the president had vetoed with a 2/3 
vote (Haskell and Gold 2006). 
President Clinton used the line-item veto eleven times before the Supreme Court 
declared it unconstitutional in Clinton v. New York (1998).  The Court found that the line-
item veto violated separation of powers in that it essentially allowed the president to 
rewrite bills.  When the president makes a constitutional challenge to a bill in a signing 
statement and states that he will not enforce that part of the law it is essentially the same as 
striking it out with a line-item veto.  And, according to Cooper, this action is even less 
defensible than the line-item veto because congress actually granted the president the 
power to use the line-item veto (2005: 223).  No act of congress has ever purported to grant 
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the president the power to issue a signing statement.  In addition, the Line-Item Veto Act 
included an override procedure and was still found unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court.  There is no such procedure for overriding a signing statement. 
 
Executive Orders 
Signing statements also are sometimes compared to the executive order.  While a 
president could use these two tools to meet the same goal, there are some important 
differences.  One such difference is executive orders, can be revoked by future presidents or 
by new laws passed by congress.  Thus they are more limited than signing statements 
because signing statements stay with the particular piece of legislation.  Therefore, they will 
continue to be effective unless the law itself is repealed by congress or is found 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.  Another difference is the broad nature of signing 
statements starting with Bush II – applying to multiple laws at once. 
There is no constitutional provision granting the president the power to use either 
an executive order or a signing statement and yet there is a long tradition behind both 
tools.  While the Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutionality of signing 
statements, it has addressed executive orders.  In Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer 
(1952) President Truman used an executive order to facilitate governmental control of the 
steel industry.  He believed that the takeover was necessary as a matter of national security.   
In most circumstances the production of steel would be seen as a domestic issue.   
But, at the time the United States’ war effort in Korea was dependent on this industry.  To 
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Truman this moved the steel industry from a domestic issue to a foreign affairs issue.  That 
move was important because the Court recognized in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp. (1936) that the president is the “sole organ” of American international affairs.  As 
such, he is given greater leeway to take unilateral action in this area.    
The Court however did not share Truman’s view and distinguished Youngstown 
from Curtiss-Wright.  They found that his actions had gone beyond his power to execute the 
law.  Nevertheless, they didn’t rule that the executive order was the problem.  Instead, they 
explained the order constituted an attempt to make law rather than an attempt to clarify a 
law passed by congress.  Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion, which has taken on 
precedential value, explained three different scenarios for presidential action.  In the first 
the president is acting pursuant to authority granted by Congress, in the second the 
president takes action in the absence of a congressional grant or denial of authority, and in 
the third the president acts contrary to the express or implied will of Congress.   The 
Youngstown case was in the third category, the one where the president’s power is at its 
“lowest ebb,” and therefore the president’s action was struck down.  As a result, presidents 
since Youngstown make an effort to cite the congressional authority for executive orders 
they issue. 
Impoundment; a Specific Use of the Executive Order 
The court addressed one very specific use of executive orders in Train v. City of New 
York (1974).  In this case the order was used as a way for the president to get around fully 
funding federal programs with which he didn’t agree, a procedure known as 
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impoundment.  Essentially the president issues an executive order to the treasury 
forbidding them from releasing the funds.  This was a tactic favored by the Nixon 
administration.  In the Train case the court found that the practice frustrated the will of 
congress and was therefore not an appropriate use of the executive order.  As in 
Youngstown, the problem was not the order itself but the lack of congressional authority for 
the action. 
Veto 
Signing statements are often compared to the veto as well.  However, there are 
some distinctive differences between the two.  While a veto does have more certainty and 
finality in one respect, it also can be overridden.  A signing statement, on the other hand, 
gives the president the final advantage because there is no congressional review of the law 
after it is issued (Kelley and Marshall 2008).  This “final word” quality makes the signing 
statement similar to an absolute veto because congress does not have the power to override 
it.  In fact, they don’t even have the opportunity to debate or vote on the content of a 
signing statement unless they decide to enact new legislation in the future.  Furthermore, 
even if they do pass a new law on the matter, it too could be subject to a signing statement.  
While the founders did not address the constitutionality of signing statements, they did 
unanimously vote down a proposal to grant the president an absolute veto (Garber and 
Wimmer: 373).  
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
INTRODUCTION 
What effect do signing statements have on the balance of power between our three 
branches of government and what is a president to do when a bill he believes includes 
unconstitutional provisions hits his desk?  For an absolutist the answer is easy: The 
president can sign it, or he can veto it.  These are the only two options given in the 
constitution as spelled out in the “presentment clause” (Article II, § 7).  Others would argue 
the constitution is a living document and the long history of using signing statements has 
created a place for them within the procedures that regulate the three branches of 
government (Seeley: 182).  Those in favor of the liberal use of signing statements also 
would point to the fact that there is nothing in the constitution that prohibits their use and 
the Supreme Court has never addressed their constitutionality, indicating either that they 
approve of the use of signing statements or that they consider them a “political question” 
and, therefore, not subject to judicial review. 
 
GUNS DON’T KILL PEOPLE.  PEOPLE KILL PEOPLE. 
What do guns have to do with signing statements?  Good question.  The easy 
answer would be nothing.  On the other hand, the same argument made in support of 
owning a gun has been made in support of signing statements.  The weapon isn’t the 
problem.  The problem is the person in control of it and the choices that person makes.  
According to the CRS Report, there are not constitutional problems with the signing 
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statement as a tool.  The problem it identifies is the view of presidential authority that 
allows a president to use this tool to substantively affect a law while signing it at the same 
time.   
Bradley and Posner make a similar argument in their article.  They claim that the 
problems critics have are not with signing statements per se, but with how they are used. 
Because of this, they argue that attacks on signing statements are misplaced.  After all, 
presidents could use executive orders or memoranda to reach the same result.  They 
encourage critics to focus on the underlying policy, which they believe is the root of the 
critique (Bradley and Posner). 
This argument has a great deal of appeal on the surface, but it fails to address some 
important details.  As with guns, it takes the weapon and the person to do the damage.  
And, like a gun, this particular weapon has proved to be powerful and, at times, extremely 
damaging.  As Cooper pointed out in his article “George W. Bush, Edgar Allan Poe, and the 
Use and Abuse of Presidential Signing Statements,” the signing statement has the unique 
quality of allowing the president to take controversial action but hide it in plain view.  
Because so few people are aware of signing statements and there is rarely any fanfare in 
conjunction with their release, they inflict their damage right in front of our faces and 
usually we don’t even know it has happened. 
So, what is to be done?  It is not an easy question because the answer will be 
different depending on the type of statement and the purpose behind it.  Bradley and 
Posner are correct that the underlying policy behind a signing statement is often the root of 
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the problem.  So, let’s start there.  In the next section, I will examine substantive signing 
statements in detail.  I will look at the purpose of the signing statement and whether the 
challenges the president makes are based on interpretation of the statute or claims of 
constitutional issues with the statute.  It is important, however, to keep in mind that often a 
statement will fall under both the interpretive and the constitutional categories and that 
presidents sometimes use both, or either, category to reach the same ends.  This makes their 
classification somewhat tricky, but not impossible.   
  
SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE JUDICIARY 
Interpretive Statements Designed to Influence the Judicial Branch 
There is much debate over the question of whether the judicial branch should take 
the president’s interpretation of a bill into account in court.  The Reagan administration 
certainly believed the practice was appropriate.  As discussed above, Edwin Meese, 
Reagan’s Attorney General, made sure signing statements were easily accessible to the 
judicial branch by working with West Publishing to include signing statements as part of a 
bill’s legislative history.   The Reagan administration did this as one piece of a larger plan to 
regain power for the president that they believed had been taken by congress after the 
Watergate scandal.  They believed that including the views of the president in the form of 
signing statements in the legislative history of a bill would increase the influence of the 
presidency vis-a-vis congress in the eyes of the courts.  The appropriateness of using 
signing statements to influence the courts has been debated ever since. 
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That debate includes a couple of different questions.  First, should the president’s 
interpretation of a bill be included in legislative history at all?  After all, he is not a part of 
the legislative branch.  But, the president does play a role in the legislative process by 
signing or vetoing bills.  He also, of course, plays a role during the earlier stages through 
negotiations with congress to try to get congress to pass laws that will advance the policy 
goals of the administration.  Second, should the courts accept the president’s 
interpretations?  While that is an important question, this paper will focus on the 
constitutionality of the president’s actions in using interpretive signing statements.  The 
weight the courts should give them is a subject for future research. 
As explained above, sometimes the president writes an interpretive signing 
statement to explain ambiguous or undefined terms.   Whether the president is acting 
constitutionally in writing such a statement depends on whether the terms were truly 
ambiguous or undefined.  The fear is the president will identify ambiguities and exceptions 
in an act even if they were not apparent during the legislative process.  In this situation, the 
president is essentially interpreting the law, which is the job of the judicial branch, and by 
rewriting it, he is making law, the job of the legislative branch (see discussion of 
Immigration Reform and Control Act below for example) (Garber and Wimmer: 367).   
Second, even if the language truly is ambiguous, there is still a question as to 
whether the president’s interpretation should be considered.   One argument in support of 
using the president’s interpretation in this way is that the president is the head of the 
various executive branch agencies.  In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
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Council, Inc. (1984) the Court found that deference should be given to the interpretations of 
agency directors.  Presidents have inferred from this that, since the agency director’s 
interpretation receives deference, then the person that director reports to should receive 
deference as well.  But, the underlying reason to grant deference to agency heads was that 
they have expertise in the particular subject matter.  The president does not have that same 
expertise and, therefore, his interpretation of ambiguity in statutes does not deserve that 
same deference (Garber and Wimmer: 387).  
Not all interpretive signing statements are designed to clear up ambiguity.  
Sometimes the president writes the statement to offer background and support regarding 
the purposes behind the law.  When this is done to influence the courts, the president is 
hoping that the background he gives will be accepted by the court and used to help decide 
future cases.   
It has been argued that it is never appropriate for a court to use a signing statement. 
to determine congressional intent (Garber and Wimmer).  If that is true, then it would 
logically follow that the president should never issue a statement for this purpose.  When 
this argument is made the term “congressional intent” is sometimes used interchangeably 
with “legislative intent.”  Garber and Wimmer argue quite convincingly that a signing 
statement is not evidence of congressional intent.  They are right that the president does not 
speak for congress.  But, it does not necessarily follow that the president’s input should not 
be considered in determining legislative intent.  The president has a clear role in the 
legislative process.  As such, his statements regarding what happened during that process 
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seem to be just as valuable (or as unreliable, as the case may be) as the statements of 
members of congress who were involved in the process.  Therefore, using congressional 
intent and legislative intent interchangeably is a mistake when evaluating the appropriate 
use of this type of statement.  Garber and Wimmer argue that the courts must recognize 
that these signing statements only contain the views of the executive branch and are 
“constitutionally unreliable indicators of congress’s will” (Garber and Wimmer: 381).  That 
is true, but it does not mean that the views of the executive branch that are expressed are 
not valuable information about the legislative process.   
It is important to remember that signing statements designed to influence the courts 
as part of the legislative history are subject to the same problems as statements of members 
of congress regarding legislative history.  The most common complaint is that such 
statements are unreliable because the people who make them are likely to be taking 
creative license and “planting” history strictly for the purpose of influencing the court 
(Carroll: 516).  But, this “people kill people” argument is evidence of why the court should 
be careful and selective regarding any external evidence they accept and not evidence of 
why signing statements in particular should not be used as part of legislative history.   
  
Constitutional Statements Designed to Influence the Judicial Branch 
Another way presidents use signing statements is to influence the courts.  In such a 
case, the president claims that a provision of a bill is unconstitutional in an attempt to 
influence the court’s determination in the event a challenge arises.  The role of the Judiciary 
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to determine what is constitutional and what is not was declared in Marbury v. Madison 
(1803) and reaffirmed in multiple cases including Baker v. Carr (1962) and U.S. v. Nixon 
(1974).  Even so, it is unreasonable to believe that the president of the United States would 
not hold his own opinions on issues of constitutionality as well.  The Court recognized in 
U.S. v. Nixon that each branch at times will need to interpret the constitution and determine 
questions of constitutionality (U.S. v. Nixon 1974).  Therefore, if faced with a provision that 
he believes is unconstitutional, the president may state his belief in a signing statement in 
order to bring that provision to the court’s attention.  While it is not common for the courts 
to refer to signing statements in their opinions, they have done so occasionally.  In INS v. 
Chadha (1983), for example, the court referred to the fact that 11 presidents had gone on 
record challenging the constitutionality of the congressional veto.  However, the court did 
not rely on the signing statements in making its decision (Kepplinger 2007: 41).   
 
Does Lack of Judicial Reliance Make These Statements a Non-issue? 
The argument has been made that the courts rarely refer to signing statements in 
their decision making; therefore people should not be concerned about them.  The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) addressed this in their report “Presidential 
Signing Statements Accompanying the Fiscal Year 2006 Appropriations Acts.”  Saying they 
are not used often, however, is a far cry from saying they are not used at all.  It only takes 
one bullet to kill someone and it only takes reliance on one signing statement to violate the 
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separation of powers doctrine and insert the opinion of the president in place of the 
opinion of the court.   
Courts actually have used signing statements for many different reasons in their 
opinions.  In United States v. Lovett (1946), the Court cited President Roosevelt’s signing 
statement in which he declared that a provision of a bill essentially firing three federal 
employees was an unconstitutional bill of attainder.  The Court agreed with the president 
and found the law unconstitutional.  In Bowsher v. Synar (1986) and U.S. v. Lopez (1995), the 
Court, in striking down the laws in question, referred to the fact that the president also 
thought the statute in question was unconstitutional.  In United States v. Yacoubian, the 9th 
Circuit relied on a signing statement when explaining the fundamental purpose of the 
statute (1994).  Similarly, a signing statement was used as confirmation of the reading of 
statutory language in Mayhew Inc. v. Wirtz (1969).  And, at times, the Court even has used a 
signing statement to tip the scales in one direction or the other when they reach an impasse.  
They have done this both by relying on a signing statement or ignoring it, whichever is 
necessary in the situation (Carroll: 512).   
Support for the argument that courts rarely use signing statements is offered in the 
GAO letter "Presidential Signing Statements Accompanying the Fiscal Year 
2006Appropriations Acts."  The GAO letter states that the court infrequently cites signing 
statements. According to the letter, the federal courts have done so in conjunction with 
legislative history about 40 times (Kepplinger 2007: 38) and have referred to constitutional 
signing statements in about 20 opinions (Kepplinger 2007: 40).  The letter further states that 
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there have been a total of only 137 references to signing statements by federal courts and 
only five of these were in Supreme Court cases (Kepplinger 2007: 37).  Given that the 
Supreme Court decides between 75-80 cases each year, this number of references is low 
(Supreme Court Web Site).  
But, the letter is either missing or ignoring a trend in the Court’s use of signing 
statements.  The report states that there have only been 137 cases in which signing 
statements are mentioned.  But, all of the cases they reference in the report were decided 
between 1945 and 2007.  And, all but two of the cases were decided between 1983 and 2007.  
The fact that so many of the cases that do cite signing statements were decided during or 
after the Reagan administration seems to indicate that Ed Meese’s effort to include signing 
statements in legislative history has been successful.   
 
SIGNING STATEMENTS AND EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 
Interpretive Statements Designed to Direct Executive Agencies 
Article II, § 3 of the constitution includes the “take Care” clause:  the president shall 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”  In doing so, he needs to give some 
direction to the executive branch agency that will be responsible for executing the law.  
Sometimes this means clarifying terms or provisions that seem ambiguous.  While this 
seems innocuous, a problem can arise if the president substitutes his interpretation of the 
law for what congress actually wrote.  If this happens, he takes on a policy making role that 
is not supported by any of his enumerated powers (Garber and Wimmer: 381).  In 
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Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer (1952), the Court held that the “take Care” clause limits 
the president’s power in the legislative process to “recommending laws he thinks wise and 
vetoing the laws he thinks bad” (Youngstown: 587).  In Youngstown, the Court did not allow 
the president to make policy through the use of an executive order even in the extreme 
circumstances of war.   It follows that the president should not be allowed to make policy 
by using a different tool, a signing statement (Garber and Wimmer: 382).   
Signing statements become problematic when the president replaces the 
interpretation of congress with his own understanding of the law.  One way the president 
could do this would be to find “ambiguities” when none were apparent in the actual 
legislative process.  For example, President Reagan included a statement when he signed 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.  The act gave “amnesty” to certain 
undocumented immigrants but required them to have continuous physical presence in the 
country.  The act also stated that “brief, casual, and innocent” absences would not 
terminate continuous presence.  In his signing statement, President Reagan included a 
requirement that the immigrant must apply to the INS for permission to leave before even a 
“brief, casual, [or] innocent” absence.  This clarification was really an addition made by the 
president.  This added requirement was used by the INS when enforcing the statute so the 
president effectively rewrote the law (Garber and Wimmer: 368-369). 
This process of issuing a signing statement to rewrite a law infringes upon the role 
of congress and violates the separation of powers doctrine.  By doing this, the president 
crosses into a policy making role that is not within his power (Youngstown).  But, if the 
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president is only clarifying terms or clearing up ambiguities to ensure that the intent of 
congress is carried out, there should not be a problem with the statement.  Often the 
question comes down to whether the president’s motives are pure in the use of the signing 
statement or whether he is making an “end run” around congress.  In the first instance the 
signing statement may be appropriate; in the second, it never will be. 
 
Interpretive Statements Designed to Avoid Unconstitutional Laws 
Occasionally the president will claim that there is ambiguity in a law and that, if 
read the wrong way, the law would be unconstitutional.  In these instances, the president 
will direct the executive agency to follow the interpretation that will avoid the 
constitutional problem.  This is using the doctrine of constitutional avoidance that has been 
embraced by the courts.  As Justice Holmes explained in Blodgett v. Holden (1927), “the rule 
is settled that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would 
be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save 
the act.”  It is appropriate in these instances for the president to set forth an interpretation 
that saves the act (Seeley: 181).   
 
Constitutional Statements Designed to Direct Executive Agencies 
 While the first constitutional challenge to a bill through a signing statement can be 
traced back to President Tyler, it was many years before they were used to direct an 
executive agency not to enforce the bill as written.  According to the ABA taskforce, this 
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didn’t happen until 70 years after the ratification of the constitution (ABA report: 7).  Early 
use of constitutional signing statements focused on influencing the courts or putting 
congress on notice that the president did not believe a provision was constitutional and 
would not provide a legal defense for it if it was challenged.  FDR did this when signing the 
bill that he believed included a bill of attainder (Kelley and Marshall, 2009:515).  More 
recently, however, presidents have used these statements to direct the executive branch not 
to follow provisions that they believe are unconstitutional.  For example, when signing a 
bill that he believed unconstitutionally restricted his duty to protect national secrets, 
president Reagan stated that the offending section “will be considered of no force or 
effect”(Cooper 2002: 205). 
The nature of constitutional challenges in signing statements has changed 
dramatically over time, especially with the Bush II Presidency (Kelley and Marshall 2009: 
510).  Bush II expanded the scope of signing statements.  Instead of pointing out specific 
problem provisions, he directed the executive branch to ignore “vast swaths of laws” 
(Savage: 2006).  The Bush II administration built on the expansion that began with Reagan 
in significant ways.  Scholars believe they did this in an attempt to reposition the powers of 
the Presidency relative to congress (Cooper 2005: 516).  The broad nature of the challenges 
is evident when comparing the number of statements written to the number of challenges 
made.  While President Bush only issued 161 signing statements in his 8 years in office, 
they amounted to challenges to more than 1,100 provisions of law (Kelley and Marshall 
2009: 515).  Challenges were used so often that Cooper claimed that during Bush II’s first 
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term the default position became “when in doubt challenge legislative provisions whether 
there is a serious issue or not” (Cooper 2005: 351).   
As mentioned above, the court held in U.S. v. Nixon (1972) that from time to time 
each branch will need to make its own determination regarding whether something is 
constitutional.  But, the court followed up by saying that it is “emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”  These two statements may 
seem to be contradictory but that is not necessarily the case.  The problem can be rectified 
by looking at the purpose behind the claim of constitutionality or unconstitutionality.  If the 
reason the president states that something is unconstitutional is to make his view known to 
the court, this would seem to be appropriate according to U.S. v. Nixon (1974).  But, if the 
reason is to direct an agency not to follow the provision based on the president’s 
determination that the provision is unconstitutional, then he would have encroached on the 
power of the court to say “what the law is.”   
    
Does Lack of Executive Enforcement Make These Statements a Non-issue? 
Some supporters of signing statement argue that the impact of constitutional 
challenges has been greatly exaggerated.  These arguments typically focus on the Bush II 
administration and the fact that 1,100 challenges does not necessarily mean 1,100 instances 
in which the administration actually followed the instruction of the signing statement 
(Kelley and Marshall 2009:515).  Bradley and Posner take this a step further and claim that 
critics of Bush II’s use of signing statements “have not identified a single instance where the 
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Bush administration followed through on the language in the signing statement and 
refused to enforce the statute as written” (332).     
However, the GAO came to a different conclusion when examining the challenges 
made to the 2006 appropriations bills.  Their research involved 12 bills and 11 signing 
statements.  The GAO found that those 11 statements included challenges to 160 provisions 
of law.  The GAO then closely examined 19 of those 160 challenged provisions and found 
that the agency did not enact six of the provisions as written (Kepplinger 2007: 9).   
While they state that they cannot conclude that the noncompliance was a result of 
the signing statement, they did not rule out that possibility either.  They also do not explain 
in their letter why the 19 provisions were chosen or why more provisions were not 
examined.  And, they downplay the fact that of the provisions they examined 32% were not 
enforced as written.  If these provisions and these 11 signing statements are to be taken as a 
representative sample, then one could infer that 32% of all laws with signing statements are 
not enacted as written.  This may not be a reasonable inference given the lack of 
explanation of methods in the GAO letter.  But it is just as plausible as the inference that the 
instances of noncompliance are actually very low. 
The assertion that signing statements are not likely to be enforced is at best dubious 
in light of the evidence presented so far.  Even if it is true, the uneven enforcement of 
signing statements causes uncertainty and this uncertainty is an evil in and of itself 
(Eggspuehler 2007).  According to Cooper, the impact of a signing statement on the 
implementation of a law may not be obvious right away (Cooper 2005: 520).  If that is true, 
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the GAO’s 2007 letter examining statements attached to the 2006 Appropriations acts may 
be missing the significance of those statements that will only become clear at some later 
date.  The signing statement stays with the legislation and could be enforced down the road 
to change the direction of the administrative agency if the president is unhappy with the 
execution of the bill as written.  
 
STATEMENTS AND CONGRESS 
Whether interpretive or constitutional, substantive signing statements are 
sometimes issued by the president in an attempt to influence congressional action.  
Through the statement, the president gives congress notice that they should repeal the 
sections he finds inappropriate or face a veto with similar sections in the future.  This likely 
was the purpose behind the statements of President Jackson and Tyler who first made 
substantive remarks in a signing statement.    
A more recent example is the statement President Clinton issued when he signed 
the 1996 National Defense Authorization Act.  It included a provision that required the 
discharge of service members who tested positive for HIV.  President Clinton had vetoed a 
prior bill including that same provision but it reappeared in this act.   Instead of vetoing the 
bill and dealing with the consequences of a likely military shutdown due to lack of funding, 
he declared in his signing statement that the provision was unconstitutional and it would 
not be defended.  President Clinton never had the opportunity to make good on this 
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promise because congress repealed the provision before any legal challenges were mounted 
(ABA report: 13-14).   
  
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SIGNING STATEMENTS 
Introduction 
While signing statements are not new, Figure 1 and Appendix 1 indicate that their 
use has increased and their purpose has shifted significantly over time especially since the 
Reagan administration.  Simply asking whether signing statements are constitutional is not 
the right question.  As explained above, they are used for many different purposes and 
many of them are designed to achieve more than one goal at a time.  Rhetorical statements 
only serve as glorified press releases; therefore scholars agree that they do not raise any 
constitutional problems.  Substantive statements are much trickier and require a deeper 
evaluation to determine the constitutional implications. 
 
Substantive Signing Statements and Constitutionality 
Not all substantive signing statements are created equal.  They are used to interpret 
a law, to avoid constitutional issues, to influence the courts, to influence congress and to 
direct executive agencies.  When determining whether any of these uses are constitutional 
further questions need to be evaluated.  The most important inquiry is how genuine are the 
president’s interpretive or constitutional concerns and what orders does he give as a result 
of those concerns?   
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Whether or not the president’s interpretive or constitutional concerns are genuine is 
an important question.  If the signing statement is being used as a way to say one thing (e.g. 
that the law is ambiguous) but do another (e.g. insert the president’s own interpretation in 
place of that of congress) serious constitutional problems could arise.  This issue has been 
raised by many commentators regarding signing statements.  Defenders of the tool often 
point out that this problem is not unique to signing statements but exists in every aspect of 
a president’s job.  Signing statements are unique, however, in that they can serve as the last 
word on the meaning of a bill.  As a result, there is increased potential for negative 
consequences that can result from using them in a less than forthright manner.  This would 
be the case if the president claims there are constitutional issues with a bill as a guise for 
making an end run around congress.  This is a difficult issue because there doesn’t seem to 
be a check on this power.  There certainly is not one in the legislative process as laid out by 
the constitution.  Because the Supreme Court has avoided addressing signing statements in 
their decisions so far, it is a problem that has evaded review.  While the question of the 
review of signing statements is important, it is beyond the scope of this paper and is 
recommended as a topic for future research.   
Before explaining what constitutional problems a signing statement might cause, 
one more question must be answered about the statement.  It must be determined whether 
the president is using the statement to shine a light on possible problems or if he is using it 
to rewrite the law and direct noncompliance.  The direction the president gives is the 
critical determinant in the constitutionality of a signing statement. 
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Arguments against the use of the signing statement generally involve either the 
presentment clause in Article I, § 7, the separation of powers doctrine, or both.  The 
presentment clause is the section of the constitution in which the president’s legislative 
involvement is explained.  According to this section, after a bill has passed both houses of 
congress it is to be “presented to the president of the United States: If he approve he shall 
sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections.”  This return process is the 
presidential veto.  The section then goes on to explain the process through which congress 
can overturn that presidential veto.  This is a clear procedure and it has been cited in 
Supreme Court cases when the president has overstepped his bounds and attempted to 
write legislation and not just implement it (Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer 1952).  
While the Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether signing statements violate 
this procedure, critics argue that because this clear procedure doesn’t allow for a signing 
statement, they cannot be used.  Those adhering to this absolutist position claim that the 
only constitutionally appropriate option the president has when faced with a bill that he 
believes has constitutional or interpretive issues is to veto it (ABA report). 
While this is an appealing argument, supporters of the use of signing statements 
point to the fact that the Supreme Court is aware of the use of signing statements and has 
not directly addressed the constitutionality of their use.  They argue that this means the 
Court is implicitly approving the use of signing statements.  They also argue that signing 
statements are a flexible tool that helps avoid stand offs with congress regarding critical 
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legislation (Kelley and Marshall 2008: 255).  And, finally, there is nothing in the constitution 
or an act of congress prohibiting the addition of a statement with the signing of a bill.   
The other most common argument against the use of the signing statement is based 
on separation of powers.  Supporters of this argument claim that the president actually 
could infringe on the powers of both the legislative and judicial branch at the same time by 
issuing a signing statement.  This occurs because the president, by making changes to a bill, 
is essentially rewriting it; thereby making law and infringing on the powers of congress.  
When the president does this because he is expressing his belief that provisions in the bill 
are unconstitutional, he is infringing on the power of the judicial branch to “say what the 
law is” (U.S. v. Nixon 1974). 
Whether the president is actually infringing on those powers, however, rests on 
what instructions he is giving to the enforcing agency in the signing statement.  If the 
statement instructs the agency to follow the president’s interpretation instead of a contrary 
interpretation offered by congress, there is a clear violation of separation of powers.  In that 
situation, the president essentially is rewriting the law because he is directing the executive 
branch not to enact the law as written but to enact it with his changes.   
When the president makes constitutional challenges to a law, the constitutionality of 
the statement will again rest on what he instructs the executive agency to do.  If the 
statement declares “I believe this section is unconstitutional but you should enforce it 
anyway,” the president is not using Presidential Review that is similar to Judicial Review 
because he does not claim to be the final decision maker on the constitutionality of the law.  
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Instead, he is making the kind of determination about constitutionality that the founders 
anticipated in Federalist Paper 49 and that the Court references in U.S. v. Nixon (1974).  On 
the other hand, if the president uses the statement to instruct the agency to ignore the 
provisions he believes are unconstitutional, he has rewritten the law and infringed on the 
judicial branch’s power of judicial review at the same time.  In these situations, it is difficult 
to come to any conclusion other than that this is an unconstitutional violation of the 
separation of powers doctrine.   
Relying on the presentment clause alone is insufficient unless the critic is willing to 
take an absolutist position that signing statements, even those that are completely 
rhetorical, should never be allowed.  This is because the argument is based on following a 
procedure provided in the constitution.  The procedure is clear and any variation from it is 
a violation of the constitution.  The language of the signing statement is not the issue.  It is 
the existence of the signing statement itself that violates the constitution.   
Such an extreme absolutist view has not been taken even by the most critical 
authors.  Scholarly articles and governmental reports alike have asserted that rhetorical 
statements do not cause constitutional issues.  Yet, if the president were required to follow 
the plain language of the constitution the statements would not be permitted.  The fact that 
this position has not been taken indicates that critics are not truly concerned with whether 
the president follows an exact procedure.  Instead, critics are concerned about the potential 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine that exists if the president directs his 
administrative agency not to enact the bill as written.  By focusing on this separation of 
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powers argument, it is clear that statements that inform congress of the president’s 
concerns about a law so that they may make changes in the future do not create any 
constitutional problems because it cannot be argued that the president has “rewritten” the 
law.   
Statements designed to influence the judicial branch are likewise safe from 
constitutional issues.  While some argue that the inclusion of signing statements in 
legislative history violates the separation of powers doctrine because it allows the 
president’s view of constitutionality to be substituted for the view of the Court, this would 
only be true if the court was deferential to the statements.  At most, the court has used them 
as support for their independently reached conclusions.  The Court has a tradition of 
looking to a variety of competing sources to assure that their decisions not only meet 
constitutional muster, but also don’t veer so far away from the sentiment of the nation that 
they are in danger of being overturned through a constitutional amendment.  Statements 
offered by the president regarding his beliefs about a law are one logical source of such 
outside information. 
  
WHAT IS A PRESIDENT TO DO? 
Introduction 
The question of what a president should do when faced with a bill he believes 
includes unclear or unconstitutional provisions has been tackled by presidential advisors, 
government committees, scholars, and even the American Bar Association.  The results are 
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far from unanimous.  Presidential advisors obviously have a unique point of view when 
they search for answers to this question.  Others who have drafted recommendations have 
their own potential biases as well.  The resulting recommendations have ranged from the 
argument that the president has a duty to refuse to enforce any law he believes is 
unconstitutional to the ABA’s absolutist recommendation that when faced with this 
situation the president’s only option is to veto the bill (Dellinger Memo and ABA Report). 
 The argument that the president can rely on his oath of office to refuse to enforce 
provisions of a bill after signing it has been used by more than one president (see page 30 
for the explanation of the argument).  This is an appealing argument but it ignores other 
provisions in the constitution, including the presentment clause: the president has the 
option of either signing or vetoing the bill.  His duty to uphold the constitution means the 
entire constitution and not just the parts that will make his job more convenient.  With that 
in mind, if the president believes that a bill is unconstitutional he has a duty to veto it 
according to the procedure in the presentment clause.  To do otherwise would be the 
equivalent of rewriting the bill; therefore violating the separation of powers doctrine. 
So, can the president refuse to comply with a statute that he believes is 
unconstitutional?  Under a strict reading of the constitution the answer is no.  A more 
interesting question is why would he want to?  Issuing a signing statement might be an 
effective way to advance the president’s legislative agenda in the short term.  But, in doing 
this the constitutionality of the law will not be settled.   
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The plan explained below can be used by presidents to ensure the separation of 
powers doctrine is not violated through their use of signing statements.  It is an attempt to 
balance the absolutist position that the only option for a president is to sign or veto a bill, 
with the pragmatic reality of the office.  While using the veto when faced with a bill he 
believes has constitutional issues may be the best option in an ideal world, there may be 
times that a president truly believes using it is not an option.  In those instances the 
president should take the steps outlined below to ensure that his use of the signing 
statement does not violate his oath to uphold the constitution. 
 
The Constitutional Balance Plan 
When faced with an ambiguous or vague bill, the president has a couple of options.  
If the president believes the ambiguity is harmful and cannot be resolved with a signing 
statement, he should veto the bill.  If, however, the issue with the offending language can 
be resolved by issuing an explanation of terms in a signing statement, the president should 
do this to make sure that the true intent of congress is understood and the bill is 
implemented properly. 
The question of unconstitutional provisions is a bit more complicated.  First, there 
are situations in which alternative readings of a bill would lead to a constitutional result on 
the one hand and an unconstitutional result on the other.  In these situations, the president 
should use a signing statement to explain to the administrative agency that the 
constitutional reading is what they should follow in the implementation process.  This 
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should be done as a way of giving congress the benefit of the doubt that what they 
intended to pass was a constitutional law. 
The president should first work with congress to make the legislation as clear as 
possible and to ensure that the legislation does not include provisions that the president 
believes are unconstitutional.  If the problems with the legislation have not been resolved 
by the time the bill reaches the president’s desk, he should use a signing statement as 
described above.  When the statement is issued, the president should make sure to 
announce it to congress and the public to avoid the problem Cooper described as hiding in 
plain sight (Cooper 2005) 
In the second situation the president must decide what to do when he truly believes 
that provisions in a bill are unconstitutional.  The preferred position should be to veto the 
bill following the procedure that is detailed in the presentment clause.  But, because of the 
omnibus nature of legislation today and consequences that will affect the government and 
the people of the United States if certain bills are vetoed, the president may believe that 
vetoing a bill presented to him is not a realistic option.   
Consider the case of President Clinton in 1996.  Had he vetoed the annual military 
appropriations bill because he believed the provision requiring the discharge of service 
members with HIV was unconstitutional, the consequence would have been a military 
shutdown.  This would have been on the heels of two government shutdowns that 
occurred as a result of budget battles (Kinkopf 2006).  In that situation, President Clinton 
likely believed that vetoing the bill would be political suicide, and also would cause 
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extreme hardship to military families and compromise the defense of the nation.  As a 
result, instead of vetoing the bill, he issued a signing statement expressing his belief that 
the provision requiring the discharge of service members with HIV was unconstitutional.  
Nevertheless, he directed the administrative agency to enforce the law as written (Kinkopf 
2006).   
This course of action is what is recommended here.  By shedding light on what the 
president believes is an unconstitutional provision, congress has the opportunity to make 
changes and the president is not violating the separation of powers doctrine by either 
rewriting legislation or using some form of judicial review.  After issuing such a statement, 
the president should work with congress to repeal the offending provisions.  If those 
provisions are not repealed, the president should refuse to defend the law in the face of 
legal challenges and should assist potential challengers in whatever way is appropriate.   
If the president were to do otherwise and instruct the executive branch not to 
enforce the potentially unconstitutional provisions, that action would violate the separation 
of powers doctrine and would eliminate the opportunity for a plaintiff to bring a case 
challenging the law.  This results because the provision would not be enacted as written but 
according to the president’s edited version.  The constitutionality of the provisions would 
remain unclear because they would never be subject to judicial review. 
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WHAT IF THE PRESIDENT DOESN’T DO THIS? 
It’s a Question of Standing/Review 
The procedure outlined above could be used by the Court if a signing statement is 
challenged in a case brought before them.  If the president didn’t follow the procedure, 
then his use of the statement was unconstitutional, the changes he made to the law should 
be stricken, and the agency should ignore the statement and enact the law as written.  The 
question then becomes who can challenge it.  The fact that as of yet there has not been a 
direct challenge to a signing statement in court is an issue of standing.  Congressional 
standing has been denied.  For a case to be brought, it will require an educated plaintiff 
who suffers a loss because the bill was changed by the signing statement.  While more 
people are taking notice of signing statements than in the past, this educated plaintiff has 
not yet materialized.   
The ABA has recommended that congress draft legislation creating a process that 
will allow judicial review of signing statements.  While this may be a good idea, it is 
difficult to envision what that process would be and attempts by congress to pass such 
legislation have failed so far (Halstead 2007: 27).  In addition, particularly cynical critics 
believe that such legislation likely would fail to reach its objective because it to would be 
vulnerable to an unconstitutional signing statement.  If the right plaintiff does come 
forward, the test offered here could be used to determine whether the president’s use of the 
signing statement was constitutional or not. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
Are signing statements worthy of a panic stricken society proclaiming that the sky is 
falling?  Probably not.  But, no one really wants a bunch of acorns falling on their heads 
either.  The tool has been around for centuries but is rarely made public and even less often 
understood.  The type of statements that have the most potential for violating the 
separation of powers doctrine (substantive signing statements whether interpretive or 
constitutional) are also the type that are being used more and more.  The increase in the use 
and scope of these statements began with President Reagan, reached new levels during the 
Bush II administration and, while it may have slowed down under President Obama, it 
certainly hasn’t stopped.  Bringing attention to what signing statements are and how they 
are used, therefore, is an ongoing and relevant topic for political science research. 
Signing statements are unique because they can be used by a president to take 
unilateral action and have the final word on a bill.  Yet, they have evaded review by the 
courts so far.  Therefore, they continue to hide in plain sight.  They are often compared to 
other tools of the Presidency such as the executive order and the line-item veto.  Those tools 
can be manipulated when the president’s motives are not genuine.  The key difference 
between the signing statement and these other tools is that the other tools are subject to 
checks and balances.  The line-item veto, which was ultimately found to be 
unconstitutional, was subject to congressional override.   Policies created in an executive 
order can be overturned by a new act of congress on the matter.  In the case of the signing 
statement, the president is really offered the last word.   
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Critics of the use of substantive signing statements often rely on the presentment 
clause as a reason they should not be used.  The clause offers a clear procedure to follow 
when presented with a bill and including a signing statement is not a part of the procedure.  
But, that is true whether the statement is used to make substantive changes to the bill or 
not.  The fact that no authors assert that rhetorical statements should never be issued is 
evidence that there is more than a presentment problem going on here.   
The real issue arises when the president uses a signing statement to change a law.  
He does this through interpretation or by asserting that certain provisions are 
unconstitutional and directing the executive branch not to execute the law as written.  This 
direction to the executive branch is the critical factor.  It takes the statement from a tool 
used to express the president’s opinion to a tool that allows the president to act as 
executive, legislator and judge all at the same time.  The plan for presidential action 
outlined above gives the Court a test to use when evaluating the use of signing statements 
and gives the president a way to keep his use of the signing statement within constitutional 
boundaries.   
The challenge that remains is standing.  While the ability to bring a challenge to an 
unconstitutional signing statement is tricky, it is not impossible.  One solution is extending 
standing to challenge signing statements to congress.  Absent that, we are left with finding 
a plaintiff who has suffered an injury due to the enforcement of an unconstitutional signing 
statement.  In either case, resolution by the Supreme Court is needed to finally settle the 
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issue and draw the right boundaries.  That time, perhaps we will no longer get hit by 
acorns. 
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APPENDIX 1 
President 
Constitutional 
and 
Interpretive 
Combined Rhetorical Total 
Washington 0 0 0 
Adams 0 0 0 
Jefferson 0 0 0 
Madison 0 0 0 
Monroe 0 0 2 
Adams JQ 0 0 0 
Jackson 1 1 2 
Van Buren 0 0 0 
Harrison 0 0 0 
Tyler 1 0 1 
Polk 0 0 1 
Taylor 0 0 0 
Fillmore 0 0 0 
Pierce 1 0 1 
Buchanan 1 0 1 
Lincoln 1 3 4 
Johnson A 3 0 3 
Grant 1 5 6 
Hayes 0 0 0 
Garfield 0 0 0 
Arthur 1 0 5 
Cleveland 1 0 4 
Harrison 0 0 0 
Cleveland 0 0 0 
McKinley 0 0 0 
Roosevelt T 0 1 1 
Taft 1 1 2 
Wilson 1 6 7 
Harding 0 0 0 
Coolidge 0 0 0 
Hoover 1 11 12 
Roosevelt F 3 48 51 
Truman 10 108 118 
Eisenhower 16 129 145 
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Kennedy 1 79 80 
Johnson L 13 289 302 
Nixon 8 181 189 
Ford 10 120 130 
Carter 32 215 247 
Regan 86 164 250 
Bush I 107 121 228 
Clinton 70 311 381 
Bush II 126 35 161 
Obama 9 8 17 
 
The data in the table above was compiled from multiple sources.  The numbers for 
President Washington through President Carter were originally included in Christopher 
Kelley’s 2002 paper “'Faithfully Executing' and 'Taking Care'---The Unitary Executive and 
the Presidential Signing Statement."  The numbers for President Reagan through President 
Bush II were taken from the CRS report for congress, Presidential Signing Statements: 
Constitutional and Institutional Implications.  However, that report only included Bush II’s 
first 152 signing statements.  The data for his final 9 signing statements and all of President 
Obama’s signing statements is available at www.coherentbabble.com.  
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